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"The Freedom of the Church":
(Towards) An Exposition, Translation,
and Defense
RICHARD W. GARNETT*
In his Law and Revolution, Harold Berman identified and discussed,
among (many) other things, the implications and effects of a "revolutionary
change within the church and in the relation of the church to the secular
authorities" that took place in western Europe during the late-eleventh
and early-twelfth centuries.' This "revolution," he argued, involved more
than intra-church arrangements, or relations among popes, bishops, kings,
and emperors, and "include[d] within its scope all the interrelated changes
that took place at that time," including "the revolution in agriculture and
commerce, the rise of cities and of kingdoms as autonomous territorial
polities, the rise of the universities and of scholastic thought, and other
major transformations"-including the "invention of the concept of the
State" and "the creation of modem legal systems"-"which accompanied
the birth of the West."2 And, a powerful "slogan" of the revolutionaries
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John Inazu, Michael Moreland, Marc DeGirolami, Andy Koppelman, Micah Schwartzman,
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1. HAROLD BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 87 (1983).
2. Id. at 23, 87.
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was libertas ecclesiae, "the freedom of the church,"A a "'Great Idea',
whose entrance into history marked the beginning of a new civilizational
era."4
According to Brian Tierney, "[i]t is impossible really to understand the
growth of Western constitutional thought unless we consider constantly,
side by side, ecclesiology and political theory, ideas about the church
and ideas about the state."s Relatedly, I suggested several years ago, in a
short essay about the Second Vatican Council's Declaration on Religious
Freedom, that the "idea" of the "freedom of the church"-or something
like it-remains a crucial component of any plausible and attractive
account of religious freedom under and through constitutionally limited
government.6 What is this "idea," though, and is there anything to this
suggestion about its importance and relevance? Michael McConnell
noted recently that the "'freedom of the church' was the first kind of
religious freedom to appear in the western world, but got short shrift
from the Court for decades." 7 However, he also observed, "it has again
taken center stage."8 It seems that it has,9 and perhaps not only because
legal scholars, needing topics, are straining to make something old new
again. Chief Justice Roberts, in the Hosanna-Tabor case, gestured towards
its place in the Magna Carta on the way to concluding for a unanimous
court that the Constitution "bar[s] the government from interfering with
the decision of a religious group to fire one of its ministers."10 Should
we welcome or worry about (or both) this development? And if, as the
chief justice also observed, the "freedom of the church" may, "in many
3. Id. at 87.
4. JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS
ON THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE, 202 (1960).
5. BRIAN TIERNEY, RELIGION, LAW, AND THE GROWTH OF CONSTITUTIONAL
THOUGHT 1150-1650 1 (1982).
6. Richard W. Garnett, The Freedom ofthe Church, 4 J. CATH. Soc. THOUGHT 59
(2006).
7. Michael W. McConnell, Reflections on Hosanna-Tabor, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 821, 836 (2012).
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Freedom of Religion or Freedom of the Church?,
in LEGAL RESPONSES TO RELIGIOUS PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 249 (Austin Sarat
ed., 2012); BRAD S. GREGORY, THE UNINTENDED REFORMATION 129-79 (2012); Patrick
McKinley Brennan, Diferentiating Church and State (Without Losing the Church), 7
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 29 (2009).
10. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct.
694, 702 (2012) (noting that, "in the very first clause of Magna Carta", "King John
agreed that 'the English church shall be free, and shall have its rights undiminished and
its liberties unimpaired.').
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cases ... have been more theoretical than real,"" are there good reasons
it can or should be made more "real" today?
But again, what is this idea? What are we talking about when we talk
about the "freedom of the church" and its emergence, foundations, role,
significance, neglect, and (possible) re-emergence? In Berman's account,
and in its Investiture Crisis context,12 it was the "freedom of the clergy,
under the pope, from emperor, kings, and feudal lords."l 3 It was "the
assertion of papal primacy over the entire Western church and of the
independence of the church from secular control."' 4 While we might
well hear echoes of such an assertion in contemporary disputes between
the Holy See and the People's Republic of China,'5 the question remains
whether it has any relevance, let alone importance, for the American
context.
I continue to think that it does. I will try, in this paper, to describe or
expound this idea-really, this cluster of several historical, political,
legal, and moral ideas, proposals, claims, assumptions, and intuitions-
and also to respond to some criticisms of and reservations about it. In
particular, appreciating the risk of anachronism that attends invocations
of this once-revolutionary-but-now-ancient (some might say "medieval"' 6)
idea, I will suggest some workable and, I hope, faithful translations of it
for use in present-day cases, doctrine, and conversations.
I.
Tierney opened his Crisis of Church and State 1050-1300-his study
of "the great clashes of spiritual and secular power that occurred" during
11. Id.
12. See generally, e.g., WALTER ULLMANN, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE PAPACY IN
THE MIDDLE AGES (2003); UTA-RENATE BLUMENTHAL, THE INVESTITURE CONTROVERSY:
CHURCH AND MONARCHY FROM THE NINTH TO THE TWELFTH CENTURY (1991); BRIAN
TIERNEY, THE CRISIS OF CHURCH AND STATE: 1050-1300 (Univ. of Toronto, 1988).
13. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 94.
14. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 50. See also JOHN WIrrE JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS,
RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 7 (3d ed. 2011) (noting
Pope Gregory VII's claim that "[o]nly the pope ... had authority to ordain, discipline,
depose, and reinstate bishops, to convoke and control church councils, and to establish and
administer abbeys and bishroprics").
15. See Letter of Pope Benedict XVI to the Bishops, Priests, Consecrated Persons
and Lay Faithful of the Catholic Church in the People's Republic of China (2007).
16. See Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism,
99 VA. L. REv. 917 (2013).
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that time-with a chapter called "The First Thousand Years."' It would
not be possible, even if it were necessary, to provide here a comprehensive,
authoritative account of that millennium. It is enough, though, to borrow
Tierney's observations that "[t]he possibility of a continuing tension
between church and state was inherent in the very beginnings of the
Christian religion" and that "from the first there was always the possibility
of a conflict of loyalties":
There could be little likelihood of a simple, straightforward identification
of spiritual with temporal authority in the religion of a Founder who had said:
"Render therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar's; and to God the things
that are God's" (Luke 20:25).18
Pope Benedict XVI often pressed a similar point, insisting, for example,
that "[flundamental to Christianity is the distinction between what belongs
to Caesar and what belongs to God, in other words, the distinction
between Church and State, or ... the autonomy of the temporal sphere."' 9
He has also proposed and elaborated on the suggestion that Christianity
"brought the idea of the separation of Church and state into the world"20
and thereby "deprived the state of its sacral nature." 2 1
Maybe so. During Tierney's "First Thousand Years" anyway, in most
places and for most of the time, it would have been a challenge to
identify "states," and such political or secular authority as existed would
have often been regarded by those who sought, held, and wielded it as
having something of a "sacral nature" and as being attached to extra-
temporal, spiritual responsibilities. Still, for the present purpose of
expounding the "freedom of the church" idea, it seems fair to say that,
over the course of the centuries after Constantine and preceding the
Investiture Controversy and the "Murder in the Cathedral," political or
secular authority in the west was often fragmented, diffuse, unstable, and
vulnerable, and religious or spiritual authority-also often similarly spread
out-was meaningfully distinct, even if not sharply separated, from political
or secular authority.24  And, this was the context-the reality-at and
17. TIERNEY, supra note 5, at 7.
18. Id. at 7-8.
19. Pope Benedict XVI, Deus caritas est I 28(a) (2005).
20. JOSEPH RATZINGER, THE SALT OF THE EARTH 239 (1997) ("Until then the
political constitution and religion were always united. It was the norm in all cultures for
the state to have sacrality in itself and be the supreme protector of sacrality.").
21. Id. at 240.
22. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 88 (recalling that the "kings and emperors of
western Europe in the sixth to eleventh centuries . . . were 'deputies of Christ,' sacral
figures, who were considered to be the religious leaders of their people").
23. T.S. ELIOT, MURDER IN THE CATHEDRAL (Harcourt 1964).
24. See, e.g., PETER BROwN, THE RISE OF WESTERN CHRISTENDOM (2d ed. 1996).
36
[VOL. 21: 33, 2013] The Freedom of the Church
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES
around the time the "freedom of the church" was asserted by the papal
revolutionaries.
Today's context is, obviously, different, though not so different-not
too different. In trying to identify the possible content of the "freedom
of the church" today, there does not seem to be any reason we cannot
start with what a constitutional lawyer might call its "original meaning"
-again, the freedom of the church to govern and order itself and the
limits on the secular power to interfere with that governance. If the "idea"
means anything, it means this. And, the Supreme Court in Hosanna-
Tabor appears to have (unanimously) ruled that the freedom of religion
which is recognized in and protected by our Constitution includes at least
this much. "By forbidding the 'establishment of religion' and guaranteeing
the 'free exercise thereof,"' Chief Justice Roberts wrote, "the Religion
Clauses ensured that the new Federal Government ... would have no role
in filling ecclesiastical offices. The Establishment Clause prevents the
Government from appointing ministers, and the Free Exercise Clause pre-
vents it from interfering with the freedom of religious groups to select their
own."25 Later, when affirming that an implication of these prohibitions is
the so-called "ministerial exception," he explained that "[r]equiring a
church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church
for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere employment deci-
sion. Such action interferes with the internal governance of the church,
depriving the church of control over the selection of those who will
personify its beliefs."26 This is not so different from what Pope Gregory
VII told Henry IV, and it seems to establish that there is at least something
to the "Freedom of the Church in the Modern Era."
There is more to the idea, though, than its core, and I think there is
more to its foundation than the text of the First Amendment. Instead,
perhaps we can think about the "freedom of the church" not only as a
"black letter" rule, and not even so much as a single, albeit broad organizing
principle like "equality," 27 "neutrality," 28 or "liberty of conscience." 2 9
Maybe, today, it is not so much a single "idea" or assertion as a way of
25. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct.
694, 703 (2012).
26. Id. at 706.
27. Cf CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
AND THE CONSTITUTION (2010).
28. Cf ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY (2012).
29. Cf1 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE (2010).
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describing the confluence, overlapping, cooperation, and reinforcing of a
number of constitutional, political, and moral arguments or themes. If
this is true, then the "freedom of the church" might end up functioning
less as a rule, standard, or doctrine (though it will function this way
sometimes, as in Hosanna-Tabor, Hull Church,3 0 etc.), and might-
somewhat maddeningly-work more like an animating value, even a
mood. What are some of these arguments or themes that, taken together,
where they meet, comprise the "freedom of the church"?
Constitutionalism and Structure
"Constitutionalism" may be described as the enterprise of protecting
human freedom and promoting the common good by categorizing,
separating, structuring, and limiting power in entrenched and enforceable
ways. The Constitution of the United States supplies an example. Those
who designed and ratified our Constitution understood and embraced the
idea that political liberties are best served through competition and
cooperation among plural authorities and jurisdictions, and through
structures and mechanisms that check, diffuse, and divide power.31 Our
Constitution is more than a litany of prohibitions or a catalogue of
individual rights. Our constitutional law is, at bottom, "the law governing
the structure of, and the allocation of authority among, the various
institutions of the national government."3 2 And our constitutional
experiment reflects, among other things, the belief that the structure of
government matters for, and contributes to, the good of human persons.
"Th[e] constitutionally mandated division of authority," Chief Justice
Rehnquist once wrote, "was adopted by the Framers to ensure protection
of our fundamental liberties."33 The "[s]eparation of powers was designed
to implement a fundamental insight: Concentration of power in the hands of
a single branch is a threat to liberty."34
We could go on, gathering observations by Madison and Montesquieu,
Tocqueville and Tiebout; expounding on "checks and balances,"
subsidiarity, localism, and pluralism; and compiling imposing citation
lists in support of the proposition that our Constitution was designed to
30. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (holding, among other things, that the First Amendment does not
permit civil courts to resolve "controversies over religious.doctrine and practice").
31. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
32. Gary Lawson, Prolegomenon to Any Future Administrative Law Course:
Separation ofPowers and the Transcendental Deduction, 49 ST. LoUIs L.J. 885, 885 (2005).
33. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).
34. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S 417,450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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protect individual liberty by dividing, enumerating, and reserving
governments' powers and authority. The ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment and other liberty-enhancing centralizations and concentrations
of power notwithstanding, there is no need to belabor even a point as
fundamental as this one: "The genius of the American Constitution"-of
American constitutionalism-"lies in its use of structural devices to
preserve individual liberty.""
What's more, constitutionalism relies, both in theory and in fact, not
only on the separation and limitation of the powers of the political
authority, but also on the existence and the health of authorities and
associations outside, and meaningfully independent of, that political
authority, or "the state." If Berman, Tierney, and many others are right,
our tradition of constitutionalism was made possible, and might still
depend today, on the independence of the church from secular control-
that is, on the "freedom of the church." It would be a mistake, then, to
regard "religion" only as a private practice or social phenomenon to
which constitutions respond or react. In addition, the differentiation of
religious and political authorities is, like "separation of powers" and
"federalism," both a structural feature of our Constitution and an
arrangement that contributes to its success.36
Institutions and Infrastructure
In recent years, several prominent scholars-most notably Paul Horwitz37
and Fred Schauer 38-have called attention to the importance of the
"various 'First Amendment institutions' that "serve positively to shape
and enhance public discourse[.]" 3 9 This renewed interest comes in
response, and as a correction to, the fact that-as Schauer explains-our
free-speech law "has been persistently reluctant to develop its principles
in an institution-specific manner, and thus to take account of the cultural,
35. Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1153, 1156 (1992).
36. On "differentiation," that is, the "degree of mutual autonomy between religious
bodies and state institutions in their foundational legal authority," see Daniel Philpott,
Explaining the Political Ambivalence ofReligion, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 505 (2007).
37. See, e.g., PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS (2012).
38. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment,
112 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1998).
39. Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and
Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 79, 113 (2009).
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political and economic differences among the differentiated institutions
that together comprise a society."Ao In fact, he insists, there are "socially
important institutional distinctions," and recognizing and giving doctrinal
effect to these distinctions "might well serve important First Amendment
values and purposes."41
I have suggested elsewhere that there is a place for the
"institutionalism" of scholars like Horwitz and Schauer in our thinking
about the First Amendment's Religion Clauses and about religious freedom
and church-state relations more generally.42 This suggestion has been
evaluated at length and forcefully criticized by Richard Schragger and
Micah Schwartzman.4 3 For now, though, what should be noted is that the
"religious institutionalism" claim is not only that religious institutions are,
for constitutional purposes, actors possessing religious-freedom rights that
are not reducible to the religious-freedom rights of those individuals who
participate in and contribute to those institutions. It is also a claim-
one that complements the "structural" points made above-about these
institutions' "infrastructural" role.
Jack Balkin and others have emphasized and explored the "infrastructure
of free expression," 4 4 noting that the freedom of expression requires
"more than mere absence of government censorship or prohibition to
thrive; [it] also require[s] institutions, practices and technological structures
that foster and promote [it]."45 That is, the freedom of expression is not
only enjoyed by and through, but also depends on the existence and
flourishing of, certain institutions-newspapers, political parties, interest
groups, libraries, expressive associations, universities and so on.
These "First Amendment institutions" are free-speech actors, but they
also play a structural-again, an "infrastructural"-role in clearing out
and protecting the civil-society space within which the freedom of speech
can be well exercised, and in creating the conditions and opportunities
for that exercise. I have suggested, again, that similar "infrastructural"
claims can and should be proposed with respect to the freedom of religion.
40. Schauer, supra note 38, at 84.
41. Frederick Schauer, Institutions as Legal and Constitutional Categories, 54
UCLA L. REv. 1747, 1750, 1755 (2007).
42. See Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter?: Towards an Institutional
Understanding of the Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REv. 273 (2008).
43. Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 16.
44. See Jack M. Balkin, Address at the Second Access to Knowledge Conference
at Yale University: Two Ideas for Access to Knowledge: The Infrastructure of Free
Expression and Margins of Appreciation (May 5, 2007) (transcript available at http://
balkin.blogspot.com/2007/04/two-ideas-for-access-to-knowledge.html).
45. Jack M. Balkin, The Infrastructure of Religious Freedom, BALKINIZATION,
(Apr. 30, 2007) http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/05/infrastructure-of-religious-freedom.
html.
40
[VOL. 21: 33, 2013] The Freedom of the Church
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES
Like the freedom of speech, religious freedom has and requires an
infrastructure, and the idea of the "freedom of the church" could be
helpful as we think and talk about that infrastructure. Like free expression,
religious freedom is not exercised only by individuals; like free expression,
its exercise requires more than an individual with something to say; like
free expression, it involves more than protecting a solitary conscience.
The freedom of religion is not only lived and experienced through
institutions, it is also protected, nourished, and facilitated by them. And
so, if we want to understand well the content and implications of our
constitutional commitment to religious liberty, we need to ask, as Professors
Lupu and Tuttle have put it, whether "religious entities occupy a distinctive
place in our constitutional order[.]"4 6
We should acknowledge and take care of this "distinctive place," and
attend carefully to the health of religious freedom's institutional
infrastructure. We can take on board the Second Vatican Council's call
for governments to exercise respectful care for the "conditions for the
fostering of religious life," that is, the conditions within which "people
may be truly enabled to exercise their religious rights and to fulfill their
religious duties." 4 7 To do this is not to abandon the idea that civil
governments' legislation should have a "secular purpose,"48 but instead to
appreciate that supporting the conditions-again, the infrastructure-that
make it possible for people to pursue a human good and enjoy a human
right has such a purpose.
Pluralism and Powers
I noted above that "constitutionalism" relies not only on the separation
and limitation of the powers of the political authority, but also on the
existence and the health of authorities and associations outside, and
meaningfully independent of, that political authority. Indeed, as Berman
put it, "[p]erhaps the most distinctive characteristic of the Western legal
tradition is the coexistence and competition within the same community
of diverse jurisdictions and diverse legal systems. It is this plurality of
jurisdictions and legal systems that makes the supremacy of law both
46. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Distinctive Place ofReligious Entities in
Our Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REv. 37, 92 (2002).
47. Pope Paul VI, Dignitatis humanae, at 1 6 (1965).
48. See generally, Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REv. 87 (2002).
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necessary and possible."4 9 The "freedom of the church" claim, in other
words, is a pluralistic claim, a claim that "refuses to limit the domain of
law to the law of the state"50 and that refuses to regard non-state "authority"
as existing and exercised only by state concession.
The Supreme Court decision that arguably constitutionalized the "spirit
of freedom for religious organizations" and their "independence from
secular control or manipulation," and that perhaps most clearly affirmed,
as a constitutional matter, their "power to decide for themselves, free from
state interference, matters of church governance as well as those of faith
and doctrine," was Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral.51 In resolving
what looked to some like a garden-variety land-use dispute, the Court
invalidated a state law that purported to transfer control of a church building
from one religious authority to another, and, in so doing, engaged and
took sides concerning what Mark DeWolfe Howe called "a classic problem
of political theory," that is, the
pluralistic thesis . .. that government must recognize that it is not the sole
possessor of sovereignty, and that private groups within the community are
entitled to lead their own free lives and exercise within the area of their competence
an authority so effective as to justify labeling it a sovereign authority. To make
this assertion is to suggest that private groups have liberties similar to those of
individuals and that those liberties, as such, are to be secured by law from
governmental infringement. 52
Similarly, John Courtney Murray read Kedroff as a reminder that "[w]ithin
society, as distinct from the state, there is room for the independent
exercise of an authority which is not that of the state."53  To be sure,
"pluralism" in political theory is a complicated and rich subject.54 That
said, it seems fair to say that to embrace the "freedom of the church" is
to embrace this "pluralistic thesis," and vice-versa.
49. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 10.
50. Perry Dane, The Maps of Sovereignty: A Meditation, 12 CARDOZO L. REV.
959, 963-64 (1991).
51. 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952) (discussing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1872)).
See generally Richard W. Garnett, "Things That Are Not Caesar's ": The Story of Kedroff
v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, in FIRST AMENDMENT STORIES (Richard W. Garnett & Andrew
Koppelman eds., 2011).
52. Mark DeWolfe Howe, Foreword: Political Theory and the Nature ofLiberty,
67 HARV. L. REv 91 (1953).
53. MURRAY, supra note 4, at 70-71.
54. See, e.g., VICTOR M. MUNIz-FRATICELLI, THE STRUCTURE OF PLURALISM
(2014); MARK BEVIR, ED., MODERN PLURALISM: ANGLO-AMERICAN DEBATES SINCE 1800
(2012); Michael P. Moreland, "Institutional Conscience: From Free Exercise to Freedom
of Association and Church Autonomy" (on file with author).
42
[VOL. 21: 33, 2013] The Freedom of the Church
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES
Jurisdiction and Abstention
Law-and-religion scholars are familiar with the idea that there are
some questions-"religious" questions-that civil, or secular, courts do not
answer.ss Professor Tribe, in his treatise, cites the refusal, described in
the Acts of the Apostles, of Gallio, a Roman proconsul in Greece, to
judge a complaint that Paul was "inducing people to worship God contrary
to the law." "If it were a matter of some crime or malicious fraud," Gallio
said to Paul's accusers, "I should with reason hear [your] complaint ... ;
but since it is a question of arguments over doctrine ... and your own
[that is, Jewish] law, see to it yourselves. I do not wish to be a judge of
such matters."" And in the Blue Hull case, for example, Justice Brennan
warned that judicial interpretation of religious doctrine, intervention in
religious disputes, and (attempted) resolution of religious questions are
undesirable because when "civil courts undertake to resolve [religious]
controversies . . . the hazards are ever present of inhibiting the free
development of religious doctrine and of implicating secular interests in
matters of purely ecclesiastical concern."5 7 Relatedly, secular authorities
are not supposed to decide whether a person's religious beliefs are true.
Public officials may inquire into the sincerity, but not the consistency,
reasonableness, or orthodoxy of religious beliefs.59 Courts are cautious
when inquiring into the "centrality" of a particular religious belief
or practice. 6 0 The Constitution does not permit state action that creates
or requires "excessive entanglement" between the government and religious
institutions, practices, and teachings.6 It commands that "secular and
religious authorities . .. not interfere with each other's respective spheres of
choice and influence." 62 And so on.
55. For an argument that secular courts should be more willing, in some
circumstances, to answer such questions, see Michael A. Helfand, Litigating Religion, 93
BOSTON U. L. REv. 493 (2013).
56. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1237 n.73 (2d ed. 1988)
(citing Acts 18:12-18).
57. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
58. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
59. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
60. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
61. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1985).
62. EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES 946-51
(2d ed. 2005).
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Now, I have suggested elsewhere that Justice Brennan's statement in
Blue Hull reflects questionable, unspoken premises about the "development
of doctrine" and also that, sometimes, the reason why secular courts do
not answer religious questions is because they may not. That is, it is not
simply that secular authorities have no "interest" in such matters, because
they are matters of purely "ecclesiastical concern." It is also that, at some
point, the legitimate authority of a secular, constitutional government over
these matters runs out.63 Still, "abstention" by secular authorities from
"religious" disputes and questions would seem to facilitate-by leaving
breathing room and even "autonomy" to religious communities and
institutions-the "freedom of the church," just as a commitment to the
"freedom of the church" should be seen as requiring not only that secular
authorities "abstain" from interfering in religious matters but also that
they acknowledge the limits on their jurisdiction over such matters.
It is not only, as then-Justice Rehnquist thought, that "civil courts...
should, as a matter of the wisest use of their authority, avoid adjudicating
religious disputes to the maximum extent possible. . ."6 It is not only
that-in Tribe's words-"religious truth by its nature [is] not subject to
a test of validity determined by rational thought and empiric knowledge," 5
that religious questions necessarily involve the interpretation of unfamiliar,
esoteric, unusually challenging materials, or that grappling with religious
questions is beyond the intellectual competence (as opposed to the
authorized reach) of some judges. 66 The bedrock reason, at least in some
cases, for "abstention" from religious questions-for a "hands-off'
approach to religious doctrine -is a lack of secular jurisdiction over
such questions, a lack that is both an implication of, and a protection for,
the "freedom of the church."
In my earlier essay, I expressed some doubt whether -- despite the
idea's importance-our constitutional doctrines and traditions evidence a
strong commitment to anything like the "freedom of the church." "It
63. See Richard W. Garnett, Assimilation, Toleration, and the State's Interest in
the Development ofReligious Doctrine, 51 UCLA L. REv. 1645 (2004).
64. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 735 (1976)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
65. TRIBE, supra note 56, at 1232 n.46 (quoting P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE
CONsTITUTION 26 (1964)).
66. Cf Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 714 n.8 ("Civil judges
obviously do not have the competence of ecclesiastical tribunals in applying the 'law'
that governs ecclesiastical disputes[.]").
67. See Richard W. Garnett, The Supreme Court's "Hands-Of' Approach to
Religious Doctrine: What Are We Talking About?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 837 (2009).
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could well be," I worried, "that we are living off the capital of this
idea-that is, we enjoy, embrace, and depend upon its freedom enabling
effects-without a real appreciation for or even a memory of what it is,
implies, and presumes."6' Although Murray saw a continuity between the
ancient idea and the "American consensus," 69 he insisted that our
Constitution guarantees religious freedom "to the Church as an organized
society with its own law and jurisdiction,"70 and contended that the First
Amendment actually "codified" the "freedom of the Church."71 However, I
was troubled by what I characterized as the "grab-bag" character of the
familiar, if still controversial, "church autonomy" doctrine,n and the
apparent lack of a clear rule, prohibition, or principle connected to that
doctrine. I expressed some concern that "it remains unclear and unsettled
what exactly are the content and textual home in the Constitution' for the
church-autonomy principle" and admitted that "[i]t does not seem unfair
to suggest that the doctrine has something of an emanations-and-
penumbras air about it."73
In the meantime, though, the Supreme Court has resoundingly affirmed,
in Hosanna-Tabor, what I have suggested is the core of the "freedom of
the church" claim, and the apparent fact that this "great idea" is not
reducible to one rule, test, or textual home seems, somehow, less worrisome
than it did. That its traces and influence appear in many places-in the
Court's "expressive association" doctrine,74 in the Establishment Clause's
ban on policies that create "excessive entanglement" between religious
and political authority,75 in the intriguing scholarly work of neo-formalists
and institutionalists, and so on-could signal or reflect not so much the
idea's vulnerability as its pervasive, foundational quality, and thereby
confirm Berman's provocatively sweeping proposal about its role in the
68. Garnett, supra note 6, at 64.
69. MURRAY, supra note 4, at 30-39.
70. MURRAY, supra note 4, at 70.
71. Michael J. Baxter, John Courtney Murray, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO
POLITICAL THEOLOGY 153 (Peter Scott & William T. Cavanaugh eds. 2004).
72. See Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses, 81
COLUM. L. REv. 1373 (1981); Gerard V. Bradley, Forum Juridicum: Church Autonomy
in the Constitutional Order, 49 LA. L. REv. 1057 (1987).
73. Garnett, supra note 6, at 76.
74. See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Richard W. Garnett,
The Story of Henry Adams's Soul: Education and the Expression of Associations, 85
MINN. L. REv. 1841 (2001).
75. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 46, at 62.
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development not merely of First Amendment doctrine in the United
States, but of law and constitutionalism generally. The idea, then, is
actually many ideas. And, maybe the Hosanna-Tabor case, by anchoring
the idea's paradigmatic application firmly in our Constitution and tradition,
has provided something of a fixed point of reference and contact for the
various other complementing, supporting, and operationalizing themes.
II.
Each of the themes, claims, or arguments that, I have suggested, help
to make up the "freedom of the church" idea have been closely
examined and powerfully criticized in scholarly literature and elsewhere.
Some of these criticisms are more familiar than others. Some of these
objections strike me, despite their familiarity and frequency, as not requiring
very much in the way of a response. For example, the fact that ideas like
"church autonomy" or the "freedom of the church" can be abused, or
deployed to protect or advance deeply objectionable or immoral activities
and programs, does not mean that the ideas are not foundationally important
and, all things considered, important to the common good and human
flourishing.76 The argument that rights and liberties properly belong to
individuals only, and not to groups, associations, corporate entities, etc.,
has some political appeal at present, but is hard to square with our practice
or jurisprudence. The complaint that using or protecting the "freedom of
the church" in law requires difficult line-drawing and close-call distinctions
has some force, but does not establish that this idea -but not all the many
others about which the complaint could be lodged-should be rejected.
The objection that the idea, whatever its theoretical appeal or merits, has
no place in our Constitution was difficult to sustain before and-as a
descriptive matter, anyway-is now refuted by Hosanna-Tabor.
Here, I want to say more in response to three criticisms of the "freedom
of the church" that strike me as having some force and that have been
pressed powerfully by a number of accomplished scholars, including
Richard Schragger and Micah Schwartzman. These are the "misplaced
nostalgia" objection, the "religion isn't special" objection, and the
"individual conscience" objection.
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76. Cf Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Recurring Paradox of Groups in the Liberal
State, 2010 UTAH L. REv. 47, 51 (discussing "the dark side of groups and group rights").
77. Schragger and Schwartzman advance other objections, too, in Against Religious
Institutionalism, supra note 16.
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Misplaced Nostalgia
According to Schwartzman and Schragger, the "historical account offered
,,78by some religious institutionalists is . . . incomplete[] and reactionary.
"[G]rounding post-enlightenment religious liberty in the eleventh century is
anachronistic" 79 and "selective."so And, in any event, the "freedom of the
church" invoked in the 1 Ith century "did not mean freedom of churches,"
but only the "freedom of the Roman Catholic Church," and certainly did
not include within its scope "a more modem freedom of conscience.
Those who invoke, for present-day use, the "freedom of the church"
display a "neo-medievalism," in which "it is easy to sense a form of
religious nostalgia, a certain melancholy for the passage of an age in
which everyone-or at least all Christians- shared a thick set of religious
beliefs and perhaps also a way of life based on common rituals and
practices." 82
As I see it, though, the "freedom of the church" does not-or, at least,
it need not-involve nostalgia or melancholy.83 It should not be heard,
and then dismissed, as a reactionary call for a return to a time or discourse
of organic social unity, before the collapse of "the sacred canopy," 84 the
disenchantment of the world, and the invention of penicillin. Although
we might well regret the loss or blurring of what C.S. Lewis called "the
discarded image,"" whether or not we do is a separate matter from the
place of the "freedom of the church" in our thought and practice relating
to religious freedom and church-state relations.
For the most part, the project is not the retrieval or re-creation of
Christendom or feudalism, though it is fair to say that, like pluralist
political theory more generally, it challenges the tendency in some quarters
to treat as given and permanent the post-Westphalian "state" system.
The charge that the "freedom of the church" idea, or the "religious
institutionalism" approach, reflects a fear of diversity and difference is
78. Id. at 932.
79. Id. at 933.
80. Id. at 932.
81. Id. at 936.
82. Id. at 938.
83. See GREGORY, supra note 9, at 365-87 ("Conclusion: Against Nostalgia").
84. PETER L. BERGER, THE SACRED CANOPY: ELEMENTS OF A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
OF RELIGION (1990).
85. C.S. LEWIS, THE DISCARDED IMAGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO MEDIEVAL AND
RENAISSANCE LITERATURE (1964).
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misplaced, and more than a little unfair.86 In fact, the relevant literature is
shot-through with endorsements, celebrations, and defenses of pluralism,
in both its political-theory and in its "diversity of views" varieties.87 On
the other side, however, there is more than a little influence of a shopworn
Rawlsian liberalism, the attractiveness and authority of which is more
often assumed or asserted than established.
It is, of course, true that appeals to, or efforts to mine, the "freedom of
the church" risk falling into anachronism. There is a need for translation,
not transplantation, of this idea. It is also true that, like most appeals to
history in the context of law-and-religion and First Amendment scholarship,
references to Canossa, Runnymede, and Canterbury are incomplete. It
could be true, though-I am confident that it is true-both that those
who ratified the original Constitution and the Bill of Rights did not
understand themselves to be constitutionalizing Pope Gregory VII's
claims about papal and imperial power and that the ratification of these
texts is part of a story that extends further back than the Memorial and
Remonstrance and that includes, yes, the "Crisis of Church and State,
1050-1300.""
True, whatever role papal assertions of power to appoint bishops
might have played, centuries ago, in the tangled, often unedifying history of
pre-Lockean Europe, or in the development of western constitutionalism,
our constitutional strategy and our values were (and are) different. But
the "freedom of the church" claim is a modest one, neither nostalgic or
reactionary: It is that the relevant history, or genealogy, of religious
liberty under and through law in the United States is more than, and more
interesting than, Hobbes-to-Locke-to-Madison-to-Rawls. The story began
before the St. Bartholomew's Day massacre, and, Justice Black to the
contrary notwithstanding, is not reducible entirely to a reaction by
"freedom-loving colonials" against "centuries ... filled with turmoil,
civil strife, and persecutions, generated in large part by established sects
determined to maintain their absolute political and religious supremacy."89
In any event, the "freedom of the church" project does not aim so much to
tell an alternate, or parallel, story as to make our story longer, richer, and
truer.
86. Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 16, at 938-39.
87. See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Pluralism, Dialogue, and Freedom: Professor
Robert Rodes and the Church-State Nexus, 22 J. L. & RELIGION 503 (2007).
88. TIERNEY, supra note 12.
89. Everson v. Board of Ed., 330 U.S. 1, 8, 9 (1947).
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Religion Isn't Special
First Amendment scholars have been wrestling for some time with
doubts about the justifiability of treating "religious" claims for exemptions
differently-that is, with more solicitude-than non-religious, conscientious
claims for exemptions.90 Hundreds of articles, chapters, and books have
explored the question whether and why "religion is special" (usually for
accommodations-and-exemptions purposes and less often as part of a
critique of no-aid separationism in debates about public funding for
religious schools and charities). Micah Schwartzman's What if Religion
Isn 't Special is a recent and important contribution to the discussion. 91
The "freedom of the church" idea presumes and proposes that religion
is special-or, more precisely, that religious institutions, communities,
and authorities are and should be differentiated both from political
authorities and from non-state institutions and voluntary associations
generally.92 To embrace this idea as still-relevant is to claim that religious
institutions "have a distinctive place in our constitutional order" 93-and
not a distinctively worrisome or harmful one. It is to suggest that churches
are not "just like the Boy Scouts" 94 and that, while they to a large extent
function in civil society in the same way and deliver the same Tocquevillian
benefits as any number of voluntary associations, they are, in the end,
different.
However, it is objected, "in a world of religious and associational
pluralism it is extraordinarily problematic to recognize and distinguish
some conscience-based organizations over others."95 Problematic or not,
this is, as Andrew Koppelman has emphasized, "what American law
90. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable
Indefensibility ofReligious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. J. 555 (1998); William P.
Marshall, What Is the Matter with Equality?: An Assessment of the Equal Treatment of
Religion and Nonreligion in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J. 193 (2000).
91. See also, e.g., BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2012); EISGRUBER &
SAGER, supra note 27; James W. Nickel, Who Needs Freedom ofReligion?, 76 U. COLO.
L. REV. 941 (2005).
92. As William Cavanaugh and others have shown, the category of "religion" is
problematic and it has often been used, for political reasons, to shore up a myth that
"religion" causes violence. WILLIAM T. CAVANAUGH, THE MYTH OF RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE
(2009).
93. Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 16, at 949.
94. Richard W. Garnett, Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches (Just) Like the
Boy Scouts?, 22 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 515 (2007).
95. Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 16, at 956.
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does."96 He continues, "American law singles out religion by treating it
as a good thing. The fact that conduct is religious counts as a reason to
accommodate it[.]" 97 Koppelman has argued in other work that it is not
only true that American law gives religion special treatment, it is also
fair and reasonable that it does. 98 Other prominent scholars have also
offered justifications for the "singling out" of religion,99 with John H.
Garvey's suggestion that "religion is a lot like insanity" being perhaps
the most provocative.100 I tend to agree with Steven Smith that it is
increasingly difficult, within the boundaries of argument imposed by
present-day liberalism, to justify, on principled grounds, special treatment
for religious liberty.'01 But, so what? In our history and tradition, it is a
fact that "religious" institutions and authorities have acted and been
regarded as special, and distinct, whether or not "religion" was or should be
understood as neatly and sharply separate from "culture," "conscience," or
"morality." Obviously, the empirical claims made about the distinctiveness
of religious institutions-about their work, their effects, their contributions-
can and should be evaluated, tested, and-if necessary-falsified. However,
we live under a written Constitution that "singles out" religion, and inhabit a
tradition-the entire history of the west-in which "church" and "state"
have, in a special way, cooperated and contended. If it is possibly
"anachronistic" to invoke the "freedom of the church," it is certainly
ahistorical to deny the distinctive (for better or worse) place and role of
religious actors in that tradition, and today.
Individual Conscience
Proposals to bring "the freedom of the church" back to "center stage"
-or at least to the cast of characters-have been criticized for neglecting,
or even supplanting, the rights-bearing individuals who appropriately
star in the post-Enlightenment show, or for allowing "churches ... more
religious freedom than individuals."' 02 The "new institutionalists" are
said to be proposing a "move from freedom of conscience to freedom of
96. Andrew Koppelman, How Shall I Praise Thee? Brian Leiter on Respect for
Religion, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 961, 967 (2010).
97. Id.
98. See generally Andrew Koppelman, Is It Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment?,
2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 571.
99. See generally Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion,
50 DEPAUL L. REv. 1 (2000).
100. John H. Garvey, Free Exercise and the Values of Religious Liberty, 18 CONN.
L. REv. 779, 798 (1985).
101. See generally, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Discourse in the Dusk: The Twilight of
Religious Freedom, 122 HARV. L. REv. 1869 (2009).
102. Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 16, at 921.
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the church."10 3 The "freedom of the church," some critics worry, "put[s]
church first, [and thereby] inverts the usual formulation whereby
institutional autonomy is derived from individual rights of conscience."l 04
Historically, it is claimed, "in the aftermath of the Protestant
Reformation[,] ... [t]he freedom of the church gave way to the 'freedom
of conscience,' with its emphasis on the rights of individual believers
rather than the sovereignty of religious institutions."' 0 5
The "freedom of the church" proposal, however, is not to subordinate
individuals' religious-liberty rights to those of institutions, and the claim
is not that the freedom of the religious conscience from government
coercion "derives" from the autonomy, sovereignty, or independence of
churches or other religious institutions. It should be emphasized, at the
risk of inviting charges of neo-medievalism or sectarianism, that the
Second Vatican Council's Declaration on Religious Freedom both asserted
the "freedom of the church" and stated that the "right to religious freedom
has its foundation in the very dignity of the human person." 0 6 The one
is not "derived" from the other; instead, the Declaration claims a "harmony"
between individuals' "civil right not to be hindered in living their lives
in accordance with their consciences" and the church's independence
from state oversight and control over internal matters.107  And when
Murray hailed the "freedom of the church" as a "Great Idea," he did not
present it as the source or the substitute for the immunity of the person
from coercion in religious matters, but rather as a structural protection
for that immunity. The historical and continuing significance of the
"freedom of the church" is not that it somehow grounds or trumps
individuals' religious liberty and freedom of conscience, but that it
"check[s] the encroachments of civil power," "limit[s] the reach of the
[public] power over the people," and helps to make the person-every
person-more "secure in all the freedoms that his sacredness demands."'
The "freedom of the church" can and should be seen as a structural
feature of social and political life-one that promotes and enhances
103. Id. at 970.
104. Id. at 929. See also id. at 930 (characterizing Steven Smith as claiming that
"individual rights of conscience are derived (historically and conceptually) from the
institutional freedom of the church, not the other way around).
105. Id. at 937.
106. Dignitatis humanae, at IT 2, 9.
107. Id. at s 13.
108. MURRAY, supra note 4, at 204-05.
51
freedom by limiting government-and also as a moral right to be enjoyed
by religious communities. It is not simply an effect or implication of
private, individual claims to freedom of conscience and immunity from
government coercion in matters of religious belief. The immunity of
conscience from coercion in religious matters can be said to depend on
the "freedom of the church," not in the sense that institutions are somehow
prior to persons, and not in the sense that this immunity is somehow
conferred by a church, but in a more practical, political sense. Murray's
claim was that "the protection of . . . aspects of life from the inherently
expansive power of the state.. . depended historically on the freedom of
the Church as an independent spiritual authority."' True, he worried
that the conscience of the individual was vulnerable, that it was not up to
the task of protecting itself, and that the modem state should not be trusted
to honor it. But he did not seek to subordinate it, or to substitute for it
the "freedom of the church."
These few pages are only the beginning of the response that the
various criticisms of the "freedom of the church" and "religious
institutionalism" deserve. There is no getting around the fact that the
idea is a challenge to many contemporary assumptions, premises, and
commitments. It remains to be seen whether, or to what extent, it can be
incorporated faithfully-that is, in a way that is faithful to the idea-
into an account of religious liberty and church-state relations that is
plausible, let alone attractive, to present-day citizens and scholars. It
may be that it cannot. If not, we should be willing to question both the
idea itself and the standards we use to identify attractive accounts.
III.
I suggested earlier that the idea of the "freedom of the church"-or
something like it-remains a crucial component of any plausible and
attractive account of religious freedom under and through constitutionally
limited government. I also acknowledged the risks of anachronism and
the need for translation, not merely transplantation, of that idea. Is such
a translation-a faithful one, even if not a slavishly literal one-possible?
The point, after all, of the new interest in the "freedom of the church"
should not be the gathering of intellectual-history souvenirs, or a scholarly
109. Francis Canavan, Religious Freedom: John Courtney Murray, S.J. and Vatican II,
in JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL CONVERSATION 172 (Robert P.
Hunt & Kenneth L. Grasso eds., 1992).
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version of adventure tourism, but instead the genuine improvement of
our legal regime and its justifications.
There are (at least) four substantial obstacles-some critics would insist
that they are insurmountable-to this translation effort. The first (in no
particular order) is the centrality in contemporary political theory and
morality of the individual. I have already suggested that the "freedom of
the church" need not be seen as a proposed substitute for liberty of religious
conscience. Still, the appeal of an idea that seems to privilege "institutions"
over "individuals" can only wane as we continue to think, more and more,
in terms of personal spirituality than in terms of institutional affiliation,
public worship, and tradition. It is common (and understandable) to regard
churches and their autonomy-claims as dangerous centers and sources of
potentially oppressive power, and less as structural protections for private
conscience than as threats to it, in need of supervision and regulation by
the state.
Next, there is the reality of religious difference and diversity. Today,
it is not Pope Gregory VII toe-to-toe with Henry IV, and there is no
"church" any more than there is a "state." As Schragger and Schwartzman
note, "[t]he Investiture Controversy involved a bipolar conflict between
one secular sovereign and one Church."110 Murray asked, echoing Pope
Gelasius,"' "are there two or one?" but, Schragger and Schwartzman insist,
[The question is] falsely posed. The question is rather: Are there many or one?
The issue is how the freedom of the church can be made plural-how to move
from the Middle Ages to the Reformation and eventually to our modem experience
of religiously diverse, liberal democratic societies, without losing the claim of
church sovereignty that drives the various forms of religious institutionalism.
Although institutionalists differ in how they confront this problem, none of
them have solved it. 112
They are right about the "problem" and they may also be right that it is
(so far) unsolved.1 3 I am not convinced, though, that it is unsolvable.
The third obstacle, which resembles the second, is the rise of the modem,
liberal, sovereign state and the tension between its claims and any pluralist
110. Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 16, at 936.
111. "Two there are, august Emperor, by which this world is ruled on the title of
original and sovereign right-the consecrated authority of the priesthood and the royal
power." See Garnett, supra note 6, at 67.
112. Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 16, at 936.
113. Cf Smith, supra note 9, at 278-83 ("A Retrievable Commitment?").
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account of authority. Even if it stops short of attacking non-state authorities
as "worms within the entrails" of the body politic, and even if its powers
are constitutionally conferred, enumerated, and limited, the state seems
likely to regard non-state authority as provisionally and by concession
held and exercised, and also to attempt to require that more and more of this
authority is exercised in accord with the same norms that (appropriately)
govern the state itself.14 In addition, even a careful and disciplined liberal
state is not likely to settle for night-watchman status. A state that does more
and more, in the service of its understanding of the common good and
public order, will, more and more, given the above-mentioned increase
in religious diversity, bump up against the claims and objections of religious
individuals and institutions alike. Conflict is unavoidable, and the "freedom
of the church" might seem to exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, this
conflict." 5
The fourth, and probably most formidable, obstacle to translation is
the lack of interest in translating. As always, there are those who are
comfortable with, or who have a stake in maintaining, the doctrinal and
conceptual status quo. 116 And, as Steven Smith has observed, "any ...
reorientation would require judges and scholars-and citizens generally
-to unthink and unlearn much that has come to be taken for granted,
and to recover interpretive possibilities that have largely been forgotten."17
Even if the charges that the recent flowering of interest in the "freedom
of the church" reflects reactionary or sectarian neo-medievalism are
misplaced, there is no getting around the fact that law-and-religion accounts
built upon individualism, Justice Black, and the Founders are likely to
have more curb-appeal than ones highlighting plural authorities, Kuyper
and Murray, and the Investiture Controversy.
All that said, the idea of, and the on-the-ground struggle for, "freedom
of the church" mattered in the past and matter today. It would be a good
thing if it were incorporated, in a coherent and workable way, into our
doctrines, thinking, and practice. Some things-many things, even-would
114. Cf Larry Alexander, Illiberalism All the Way Down: Illiberal Groups and
Two Conceptions ofLiberalism, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 625 (2001).
115. See MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, JOHN H. GARVEY & THOMAS C. BERG, RELIGION
AND THE CONSTITUTION 101 (2002) ("In the modem world the government plays a more
active role in our everyday lives than it did a century or two ago. . . . In a society that is
pervasively regulated, as ours now is, there are many more occasions for conflict
between the government and religious actors.")
116. Smith, supra note 9, at 283 ("The more sweeping and ambitious agenda of
current jurisprudence has, of course, developed its supporting constituencies . . . , who
would resist retrenchment.").
117. See id. ("[A]ny such reorientation would require judges and scholars-and
citizens generally-to unthink and unlearn much that has come to be taken for granted,
and to recover interpretive possibilities that have largely been forgotten.").
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not need to change. Notwithstanding the charge that the "freedom of the
church" involves the subordination of individual religious conscience to
the internal-governance rights of religious institutions, there is no reason
to think that a translation of the idea would require us to discard or water
down constitutional and statutory protections for religious belief and
(such as they are) exercise. For example, the rule that governments should
not punish or burden activity because of its "religious" character or
motivation would seem untouched-or, at least, not undermined-by any
such incorporation.' The same is true for the prohibition on government
actions purporting to require or compel religious observances or
expression." The various "no religious decisions" cases-including
Hosanna-Tabor-would stand, but on an arguably firmer foundation. 12 0
A doctrinal regime informed or animated by the "freedom of the
church" idea would, for starters, do a better job of making "church-state"
law about the nexus between "church" and "state." This is no small thing.
After all, it has been suggested that "[n]o metaphor in American letters
has had a greater influence on law and policy than Thomas Jefferson's 'wall
of separation between church and state."',l21 Philip Hamburger argued
that Jefferson's Letter to the Danbury Baptists supplied, for better or worse,
what many regard as the "authoritative interpretation" of the First
Amendment's Religion Clauses. 12 2 "Separation of church and state"
certainly can be misunderstood, and certainly can serve as clich6, a
"misleading metaphor," or a "figure of speech."1 23 Seen through the lens
of the "freedom of the church," though, "separation" is no longer an
implausible call for a "secular" public square or a limit on "religious"
arguments in politics but a realistic (and attractive) differentiation between
religious and political authority.
With the "metaphor" rehabilitated, our actual Establishment Clause
doctrines could change in at least two ways. First, the so-called
118. See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993).
119. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
120. See, e.g., Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Serbian
Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Presbyterian Church in
the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'1 Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440
(1969).
121. Daniel L. Dreisbach, Origins and Dangers ofthe "Wall and Separation" Between
Church and State, 35 IMPRIMIS 1, 1 (Oct. 2006).
122. Philip Hamburger, Separation and Interpretation, 18 J.L. & POL. 7, 7 (2002).
123. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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"endorsement test" could be abandoned. Under that test, government
policies and expression are unconstitutional if they convey, to the
"reasonable observer," an official message that "nonadherents . .. are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community."l 24 Put another way, courts applying
the test ask "whether the symbolic union of church and state effected by
the challenged governmental action is sufficiently likely to be perceived
by adherents of the controlling denominations as an endorsement, and by
the nonadherents as a disapproval, of their individual religious choices."' 25
The test and the judicial inquiry it invites have been repeatedly and, in
my view, devastatingly criticized, by Steven Smith and others. 126 For
present purposes, I will note only that the "symbolic union" just mentioned
above usually does not actually involve a "church" and the "denominations"
in question are not actually "controlling." That a particular government
action or display communicates a message having to do with a "symbolic"
connection between religious faith and politics could well be a reason to
oppose that action as a matter of the morality of liberal democracy or of
the norms of civic friendship. Such "messages," though, will rarely amount
to an "establishment" of religion, properly understood.
Relatedly, the version of the "Lemon test" that is applied in public-
funding cases could, informed by the "freedom of the church," be simplified
and improved. The Framers, after all, knew what an "establishment of
religion" looked like. They were familiar with "institutional integration"
of churches and governments; such integration was a live option, and it
was rejected in our "original disestablishment decision."l 27 It involved,
among other features, official control over doctrine and personnel, official
suppression of alternative and dissenting faiths and religious practices,
actual political entanglement between religious authorities and government,
and compelled support-not of "religion" but of the established church.128
Many others have told the story of gradual move from "church and
state" to "religion and public life" as the subject-matter of the First
124. Lynch v Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
125. School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985).
126. Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment
Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REv. 266 (1987). See also, e.g.,
Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment
Clause, 90 CAL. L. REv. 673 (2002); Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status
and Desirability, 18 J.L. & POL. 499 (2002).
127. Steven D. Smith, Separation and the "Secular": Reconstructing the
Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEX. L. REV. 955, 971-75 (1989).
128. MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, JOHN H. GARVEY, & THOMAS C. BERG, RELIGION
AND THE CONSTITUTION 17-20 (2d ed., 2006).
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Amendment's Establishment Clause. Today, in an Establishment Clause
case, we usually ask-applying the second part of the "Lemon test"-
whether a particular policy or official action "endorses" or "advances"
"religion." A translation and (re-)incorporation of the "freedom of the
church" would move us away from these questions. Instead of asking,
as the Court did in a line of now-largely-abandoned school-aid cases,
whether the government program in question has the "effect" of
"advancing" religion, or whether it is likely to create "political
divisiveness along religious lines,"1 29 it would ask whether it creates an
institutional relationship or connection that is reasonably characterizable
as a religious "establishment."
The "freedom of the church" is an old, but still important idea. It is
significantly, but not entirely, out of place in today's constitutional-law
and law-and-religion conversations. If it can be retrieved and translated,
then it should, not out of nostalgia or reaction, but so that the law will
better identify and protect the things that matter.
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